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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the role of knowledge societies, so called 
epistemic communities, in the problem-defining and initial decision-making 
stages of the EU policymaking process leading to a Proposal for amendment of 
Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the European Emission Trading System (EU 
ETS). Specifically in the decision to drastically increase the amount of allowances 
auctioned for the third phase of the EU ETS. It also includes a discussion on the 
implications of the findings for the notion of the EU suffering from a democratic 
deficit.  
The study attempts to uncover the possible influence an epistemic 
community on the 3rd meeting during the EU ETS Review in the spring/summer 
of 2007, argued to have laid the foundation for The Commission’s proposal.  
Findings imply that influence was exerted by an epistemic community on The 
Commission by framing the issue and providing viable solutions in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, and that the influence of epistemic communities can 
be seen as detrimental for the EU as a democratic organization from what is 
labelled as traditional democratic values. However, several problems with the 
theory are identified and cast a doubt on the findings, including epistemic 
communities’ ability of coordinated action. 
 
Key words: Epistemic Communities, EU ETS Review, auctioning of allowances, 
democratic deficit. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) started its operation the 1st of 
January 2005; it is the culmination of a process which began in 1992 with the 
signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)1. From initial resistance concerning the idea of emission trading at 
Kyoto, to finally accepting it in the final days of negotiations2, the ETS has been, 
and remains a matter of controversy for the EU. The apparent failure of the ETS 
in the period between 2005 and 2007 sparked even more debate and required a 
series of significant changes to the system. One of the most significant, and 
dramatic changes following the 2007 ETS review, which was proposed by The 
Commission, was the decision to increase the amount of emission permits 
auctioned, rather than handed out for free, from 5-10% in the first and second 
phase to 60% and later 100% in the period following it. Why the sudden change 
in a matter which is fundamental for the ETS? It is clear that in the formulation of 
the ETS, The Commission has been aided by a large quantity of outside sources, 
the Emission Trading Directive (2003/87/EC) was a product of a “conscious 
collective effort of The Commission to co-operate with stakeholders”3
The Epistemic Communities approach for policy analysis garnered some 
attention in the 90’s, particularly when the magazine International Organization 
published an issue entirely dedicated to presenting what was then a new and 
interesting theory
 and the 
discussions they had with over 60 industry associations and companies as well as 
governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
 
4. It explores the role of groups of experts in the agenda-
setting and problem-definition stages of policy processes5. The theory has not 
reached the level of popularity its main proponent Peter M. Haas probably 
envisioned. However, it remains an interesting approach for sub-systemic6
The ETS review, and its dramatic consequences, spanning four meetings 
which according to The Commission staff laid the ground for what would later 
become their proposal for a revision of the original ET Directive
 
analysis of policy creation and formulation.  
 
7
                                                      
1 Pew Center: “The European Union Emission Scheme, Insights and opportunities”, p 2. 
2 Damro, C & Mendez, P L in Jordan et al: “Environmental Policy in the European Union”, 2005, p 253-270. 
 Skjærseth, J B & Wettestad, J: “The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emission Trading System”, 
2008, p 2. 
3 Damro, C & Mendez, P L in Jordan et al: “Environmental Policy in the European Union”, 2005, p 256. 
4 International Organization, Vol. 46: “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy”. 
5 Haas, P M: Introduction: “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, 1992. 
6 Peterson, John: “Decision-making in the European Union: Towards a framework for analysis”, p 71. 
7 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment SEC (2008) 52, p 8. 
, presents us 
with an opportunity to employ the epistemic community theory. While other 
more established theoretical approaches such as Neofunctionalism, Moravcsik’s 
Intergovernmentalism or Institutionalist perspectives remain some of the more 
dominant theories in European studies, I believe that the epistemic community 
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theory will allow me to investigate a specific process in less abstract terms and 
hopefully acquire a deeper understanding of the daily occurrences of the EU. 
 
1.1 Disposition 
 
The following section outlines the purpose of the study as well as provides 
the overarching problem-formulation and questions to be answered throughout 
the study. A tentative hypothesis is presented and I shortly discuss the relevance 
of the chosen subject and case for Political Science and European studies. 
Methods to be used and the chosen material which I find to be appropriate for 
the investigation follows. After that, a detailed explanation of the theoretical 
framework followed by a thorough historical recounting of events leading up to 
the moment under closest scrutiny is made. Analytical focal points and relevant 
concepts are clarified before the final two chapters which discuss the findings 
and implications of it.  
     
1.2 Purpose of the study and problem formulation  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the role that knowledge 
communities, or epistemic communities which are groups of experts within any 
given issue-area sharing a certain set of characteristics might have had in the 
formulation of the proposal to amend the EU Emission Trading Directive for the 
period after the second phase sent to The Council and European Parliament for 
scrutiny 23 January 2008, following a review of the EU ETS trial period between 
2005-2007. Specifically, their role in the decision to drastically increase the 
amount of allowances auctioned. The main question for this study is: Was there 
a group of experts, an epistemic community, whether internal, external or both 
which framed the issue of auctioning allowances and set the context for possible 
decisions by providing information in favour of auctioning in the ETS Review 
framework? To answer this overarching question I pose the following inquiries to 
guide my work, and a question for discussion as well:   
  
• Were there groups of experts fulfilling the existential criteria for 
epistemic communities (explained below) present at the ETS Review? 
• Who were these groups, what types of organizations and associations 
either represented their interests and brought them forward or were de 
facto part of the epistemic communities?  
• If proven to exist, does a link exist between the epistemic communities 
and relevant decision-makers in the process? 
• If there were in fact epistemic communities at work, did they actually 
influence the final proposal? 
• If they were active, how did they frame the issue? 
• What would the influence of non-elected experts on the EU policy 
process imply for a democratic organization such as the EU?  
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1.3 Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis with which I’ll be working is that the uncertainty which 
prevails in issues as complicated as policy instruments aimed at combating global 
warming, coupled with the uncertainty policy-makers stood before after the 
failed trial period of the EU ETS and the structural crisis that followed made it 
possible for epistemic communities to heavily influence the shape of the 
amendment proposal.  
 
1.4 Introduction on expert influence on a democratic 
organization: epistemic communities and the EU’s democratic 
deficit 
 
Why is this worth knowing? Why is the impact of groups of experts on the 
European policymaking process of relevance to political science? The European 
Union is a unique entity in International Relations; a sui generis union of states, 
unprecedented and unmatched in history8. The policymaking process in the EU is 
very complex, with many differences between one process and the next “the 
same EU institutions and national policy-makers operate in different ways 
depending on the policy”9. As Bomberg & Stubb put it, the only defining 
characteristic that EU processes really have in common is that they strive to 
achieve a certain degree of consensus in a majority of cases10
The EU is not a traditional system of government, but of governance, 
needless to say it’s a complicated system of governance in which it can be very 
difficult to elucidate who governs and who makes the decisions. Questions of 
legitimacy arise, and the notion of there existing a democratic deficit, meaning 
that “the EU lacks sufficient democratic control”
.  
11 and that those making the 
decisions in the EU are not accountable to a satisfying degree, is one of anti-EU 
groups main arguments. The issue of democratic deficit is neatly summarized by 
Laffan et al as the ”result of the Union’s institutional design, decision rules, the 
dominance of delegated expert knowledge, a weakness of accountability, hostile 
public opinion in some member states, and the absence of a political community 
in the Union”12
This study, which investigates the role of epistemic communities in a 
particular policy process, is relevant to the discussion of the EUs democratic 
deficit because it aims to uncover and explicate the power of non-elected groups 
. The fear of experts having too much influence on the 
policymaking process conflicts with the basic principle of popular sovereignty in 
democratic states. The experts are not elected by the people, nor are they 
accountable to it.  
 
                                                      
8 For another point of view see Jenson, J: “Is Europe still Sui Generis?”, 2003 
9 Bomberg, E & Stubb, A: “The European Union: How Does it Work?”, 2003, p 137. 
10 Ibid, p 137. 
11 Ibid, p 157. 
12 Laffan et al: “Europe's Experimental Union”, 2000, p 202. 
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and individuals in an organization which prides itself in being a bastion of 
democracy. Just like lobbyist groups, advocacy coalitions and a myriad of less 
known intra-EU institutions are targets for analysis, so are epistemic 
communities. 
 
1.5 Methods and material used 
 
The main method of analysis employed in this study will consist of reading 
and analyzing primary and secondary official documents of the process at hand. 
Fortunately, the EU ETS Review is a fairly well-documented event for which 
extensive and comprehensive readings can be found. For the explanation of the 
theoretical approach, mostly articles published in International Organization and 
other varied sources will be used which outline the theoretical assumptions and 
methodological considerations. Previous theory-testing studies conducted with 
the same theory will serve as reference points and provide the know-how 
needed for my own study. As will be further explained, the focus will be on The 
Commission and the surrounding actors involved in the ETS Review which took 
place during 2007, literature on The Commission is not hard to come by and a 
wealth of authors is at my disposal, on the ETS Review official EU documents 
(COMs), reports and reviews will provide the basic information needed to map 
relevant actors and their contributions. To provide context for comparative 
analysis, and illustrate the uncertainty of involved decision-makers, I will provide 
a thorough examination of the history behind the ETS as well as its more current 
state. It should be said however, that comparative analysis is only used in a 
relatively small extent. As many of the theory’s basic arguments rely on the fact 
that a state of uncertainty and/or crisis is at hand, the historical presentation 
primarily serves as an indication of that. The study is conducted mainly as a 
theory consuming study as an existing theory is used to explain a specific case, 
but it involves some theory testing elements13
                                                      
13 Esaiasson et al: ”Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad”, 2004, p 33-36. 
 as well, which I hope to discuss 
further in the final sections.  
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2. Epistemic Communities and EU Environmental policymaking 
 
Refusing categorization, the European Union with its sophisticated, complex 
multi-level governance system coupled with unprecedented levels of 
interdependence and cooperation in international policy-making has given rise 
to, together with older and more established IR theories, an upheaval of 
explanatory theoretical approaches and perspectives attempting to simplify and 
explain the occurrences within the EU. The most dominant ones being Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, Neofuctionalism, Policy Network analysis, 
Neoinstitutionalism and Social Constructivism14
The epistemic community approach, which investigates the role of 
knowledge-societies
. The EU sets policy in many areas 
and the process by which they are made and implemented is so varied and 
complicated that none of the theories mentioned above, though plausible for 
specific issues, covers all areas and is capable of creating a complete 
understanding of the EU and EU policy making.  
 
15 in the policy process, has no such ambition to create a 
general IR theory, as stated by Peter M. Haas16
It’s set apart from agency centred approaches and radical constructivists by 
defining itself as a limited constructivist view, arguing that while knowledge is a 
social construction, consensus about the nature of an independent material 
reality is possible in the long run
 in International Organization.  
17
In times of uncertainty and crisis, epistemic communities can elucidate 
“…cause and effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of 
various courses of action”
. The purpose is to create a complementing 
theory useful for specific issues under certain conditions such as the uncertainty 
perceived by EU actors in the face of technical and complicated matters as 
climate change and/or crisis’s following a dramatic event where expert 
knowledge and information is needed before policy is formulated.  
The recent financial crisis serves as a good example to illustrate the kind of 
situation where the theory might be useful.  
 
18
                                                      
14 Bomberg, E & Stubb, A: “The European Union: How Does it Work?”, 2003, p 10. 
 Wiener, A & Diez, T: “European Integration Theory”, 2004, p 45-155. 
15 Sundström, M: “A Brief Introduction: What is an Epistemic Community?”, 2000, p 2. 
16 Haas, P M: Introduction: “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, 1992,  p 3. 
17 Ibid, p 24. 
18 Ibid, p 16. 
. In an issue-area such as environmental policy-
making, confusion and crisis is an everyday problem, in the EU, where policy has 
to be formulated in accordance with member states with different ambitions, 
agendas and possibilities, the complicated nature of environmental policy-
making and international cooperation the problems is further exacerbated.  
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2.1 Defining Epistemic Communities 
  
This brings about the question of what an epistemic community actually is. 
Why are they legitimate “councillors” to decision-makers? What makes them 
relevant for political analysis? The short definition, offered by the pioneer in 
epistemic community theory Peter M. Haas states that they are “a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain or 
area and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue-area.”19
2.2 Scientific Politics? 
 The argument is that growing complexity and technical 
uncertainties regarding many issues on the international agenda forces decision-
makers to seek the aid of perceived and accepted experts sharing a set of 
characteristics (see section 2.3) providing knowledge about for instance the 
acceptable level of CO2 emissions to prevent global warming. As the demand for 
information in the policy-making process grows, so does the influence of 
epistemic communities. Relative to the EU, they would be groups of experts 
sharing a worldview, causal beliefs, and notions of validity with a common policy 
enterprise consulted by relevant actors like The Commission, The Parliament, 
and The Council amongst others while formulating policy and policy-instruments 
such as the one chosen for analysis.  
 
 
Perhaps giving the impression of proposing a view on international policy-
making reminiscent of “scientific politics” a lá Comte, I should reiterate that 
epistemic community theory is only applicable in specific cases when there is a 
certain amount of uncertainty present. Further, decision-makers will, depending 
on which school of thought is employed, choose either credible knowledge 
perceived as objective or whatever knowledge they can use to further their own 
political ends.  
The choice, and use, of knowledge remains a highly political matter, 
depending in a thoroughly institutionalized and open system as the EU amongst 
other things on lobbying and path dependency20. If decision makers are 
unfamiliar with an issue, the chances of an epistemic community to influence 
rise, however, if the decision makers are familiar with the issue it is probable that 
they choose to “call on an epistemic community whose ideas ‘implicitly align’ 
with their own pre-existing political agenda and will help them further it”21
                                                      
19 Ibid, p 4. 
20 Stone Sweet, A, Sandholtz, W & Fligstein, N: “The Institutionalization of Europe”, 2001, p 18. 
21 Haas, P M: “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research 
Program”, 1992, 381. 
. Ideas 
which are in line with mainstream thought are more likely to be accepted than 
those distant to it, it goes without saying that “expensive” ideas, in every sense 
of the word, will encounter resistance. Lastly, the supposed experts do not need 
to be natural scientists, or any kind of scientist for that matter, it suffices with 
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them being perceived by the decision-makers as a sufficiently competent 
individual or group in a particular area22
2.3 Technical Criteria 
. 
 
 
On a more technical note, Haas sets four distinct characteristics to identify an 
epistemic community, they have: “1) a shared set of normative and principled 
beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community 
members; 2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of 
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and 
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between 
possible policy action and desired outcomes; 3) shared notions of validity-that is, 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge 
in the domain of their expertise; and 4) a common policy enterprise- that is, a set 
of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that 
human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.”23
2.4 Epistemic communities influence on the EU policy process 
.  
 
 
Indispensable for epistemic communities is to create some sort of link 
between themselves and decision-makers24, further, for anyone employing the 
epistemic community approach the identification of these links is fundamental 
for establishing causality. The extent to which epistemic communities 
consolidate bureaucratic power and occupy niches in advisory and regulatory 
bodies will determine their influence on the policy-making process25. These 
individuals and groups become the “baggage handlers as well as the gatekeepers 
governing the entry of new ideas into institutions”26. The quite broad definition 
of who can be part of epistemic communities can result in a coalition including 
members from think tanks, NGO’s, GPRB’s27 and key actors within and outside 
EU institutions concerned with environmental policy, capable of exerting 
“…considerable amounts of political influence by including a wide range of policy 
actors”28
However, the ways in which epistemic communities may be influential is not 
always as evident as the analyst might hope, many times, the influence is 
.  
 
                                                      
22 Haas, P M: Introduction: “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, 1992,  p 17. 
23 Ibid, p 4 & Sundström, M: “A Brief Introduction: What is an Epistemic Community?”, 2000, p 5. 
24 Sundström, M: “A Brief Introduction: What is an Epistemic Community?”, 2000, p 7. 
25 Haas, P M: Introduction: “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, 1992,  p 5 & 31 & 
Sundström, M: “A Brief Introduction: What is an Epistemic Community?”, 2000, p 7. 
26 Haas, P M: Introduction: “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, 1992,  p 27. 
27 Governmental Policy Research Bodies 
28 Gough, C & Shackley, S: “The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: the Epistemic Communities and NGOs”, 
2001, p 331. 
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indirect, meaning that the epistemic communities don’t pressure or influence 
decision-makers directly. It is rather exerted through other actors close to the 
decision makers, such as lobbyist groups, NGO’s and so on. The question of who 
is actually responsible for a particular decision taken by decision-makers when 
for example NGO’s have had a determinant role in the process arises. Was it the 
NGO, or was it the epistemic community which provided the information used by 
the NGO in their argumentation and pressuring? In a case such as this, the 
influence should be attributed to epistemic communities only if the information 
provided by them was the determinant factor behind the success of the NGO’s 
argumentation, and without which the decision-makers would have chosen 
another course of action. Problems abound, as the determinant factor behind 
success may be of several kinds, at the same time. Decision-makers personal 
beliefs, political climate, financial issues or even negotiators ability and charisma 
are all plausible and possible explanations. The issue of causality is left 
unresolved by Haas; a discussion on the matter will be presented. 
 
2.5 The Second Face of power, methodological pluralism 
 
The notion of power employed by the Epistemic Community approach 
follows “the second face of power” discussed by Colin Hay in “Political Analysis: A 
Critical Reflection”, which was first presented as a critique of the pluralistic 
notion of power, with Robert A. Dahl as poster boy, by Peter Bachrach and 
Morton S. Baratz29 in 1962. According to them, “power is exerted in setting the 
agenda for the decision-making process”30
The Epistemic Community approach is methodologically pluralistic; it borrows 
concepts from a wide range of theories including Rational Choice, 
Neoinstitutionalism and Liberal Institutionalism. Positioning itself in the middle 
of the agency/structure debate, adopting a “structurationist” view “…which 
contends that just as structures are constituted by the practice and self-
understanding of agents, so the influence and interests of agents are constituted 
by political and cultural structures”
. From this point of view, epistemic 
communities will influence EU decision-makers by setting standards and framing 
issues as well as providing the possible alternatives at hand for rational actors in 
and around institutions. They narrow the range and possible feasible outcomes 
of negotiations. The framing of ideas, and the intellectual innovations derived 
from them can take many forms, in the EU, which is relatively open for external 
influence, individuals, groups and institutions compete to make their voices 
heard. Vital for an understanding of which ideas, and which epistemic 
community, won in any specific issue and exerted influence, is a proper 
identification of the so called baggage handlers. 
 
31
                                                      
29 Bachrach, P & Baratz, M. S: ”Two Faces of Power", 1962. 
30 Hay, C: “Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction” 2002, p 174. 
31 Haas, P M: “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research 
Program”, 1992, p 372. 
. As such, the importance of institutions in 
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international and European policy-making is highlighted, bringing with it the 
concept of path dependency, meaning that when changes are made to the 
structure and are stabilized through time, they will be not be easily reversed32. 
However, in the long term, agents are not helpless victims of structural 
determinism, it’s a two way street where both “sides” shape and define the 
other. Rational actors, and their rationality, are determined by structures 
determined by rational actors. Accordingly, again in the long term, policymaking 
in the EU during times of uncertainty will not only be the result of determining 
factors from agency/structure, but from both in interplay in a process of 
socialization where the agents affected by the institutionalized views of an 
epistemic community acquire a defining role as their interpretations are made 
part of the established structure. In the short term, epistemic community’s views 
will affect policy processes and become institutionalized through “the political 
insinuation of their members into the policymaking process and through their 
ability to acquire regulatory and policymaking responsibility”33
                                                      
32 Stone Sweet, A, Sandholtz, W & Fligstein, N: “The Institutionalization of Europe”, 2001, p 18. 
33 Haas, P M: “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research 
Program”, 1992, p 374. 
. What the above 
means for a short term analysis such as my own, is that whatever views are 
presented by an epistemic community into the policymaking process are bound 
to become altered by the agents involved before they are accepted and 
institutionalized.  
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3. Background, from Kyoto to Brussels, the creation of a free-
market instrument to cope with Greenhouse Gas emissions. 
 
The EU Emission Trading System represents one of the most ambitious 
projects of the European Union since its creation. It has been called a “grand 
policy experiment”34, it is the first international emission trading scheme 
operating at scale the present scale and it is considered to the be cornerstone of 
the EU’s measures to fight climate change35
However, the establishment of this “flagship measure” has been a 
troublesome story, surrounded by controversy, and it has been widely criticized. 
The idea of an emission trading scheme was first presented by the 
representatives of the US government and Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), pursuing the free-market environmentalism introduced in the Climate 
Action Report of 1995
. The basic purpose of the ETS is to 
force EU member states to comply with the emission targets set in the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is done by expensive for companies to emit, not through taxes but 
using a market based solution. Member states set an emission cap for their 
companies through National Allocation Plans (NAPs) which determine the 
amount of emission allowances given, or auctioned, to companies, the cap set 
must be in line with member state’s Kyoto targets. The NAPs are then submitted 
for approval to The Commission which can modify them if deemed necessary. 
The end result should be that a scarcity of allowances is created for a trading 
period. The allowances, which are below what the total amount of companies in 
the EU would want to emit, are then bought and sold on a market where supply 
and demand sets the price. The companies that are able to reduce their 
emissions at a low cost will do so to avoid paying for extra allowances, other 
might cut their emissions to be able to sell their allowances to those willing to 
pay for them. The companies that don’t cut their emissions will have to pay for 
allowances as well as loose the opportunity of profiting from the trade. That is, if 
the ETS works as it is intended to. 
 
36, at the Kyoto summit based on their positive experience 
with a similar system in the acid rain program. It reflected their confidence in 
market based solutions and it was seen as a flexible and cost-effective way of 
dealing with the issue of climate change without imposing taxes on the business 
community believed to distort the global market. The US later came to reject the 
very idea of an ETS under the presidency of George W. Bush. The EU on the other 
hand, who had initially resisted the idea of an ETS in favour of the centralized 
regulatory instruments or common and coordinated policies and measures37
                                                      
34 Kruger, J & Pizer, W. A:” The EU Emissions Trading Directive: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls”, 2004, p 1. 
35 EU Commission: Questions & Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans 
36 Damro, C & Mendez, P L in Jordan et al: “Environmental Policy in the European Union”, 2005, p 257. 
37 Ibid, p 261. 
 
(CCPMs) specified in COM(97) 481 final, later accepted the proposed ETS in 
Kyoto, and began work on establishing an EU ETS almost immediately after the 
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Kyoto protocol was signed following the so-called coordination method38. Jon 
Birger Skjærseth and JØrgen Wettestad consider the change of personnel in The 
Commission as essential for the development of the EU ETS in their article “The 
Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System” (2008) 
and explained more in depth in their book “EU Emission Trading: Initiation, 
Decision-making and Implementation” (2008). The entrance of Jos Delbeke and 
his team into the climate change unit of DG Environment meant economists who 
were open to the idea of emissions trading had taken over from the “command 
and control” staff previously occupying their positions. The role of The 
Commission in formulating and implementing the EU ETS is nothing short of 
essential, as Skjærseth & Wettestad point out; The Commission was the driving 
force behind the ETS, providing the initiative and building up the necessary 
knowledge39
3.1 The first phase, lack of experience gives rise to several 
problems; uncertainty arises as the ETS is heavily criticized.  
. Eventually leading to a Green Paper on greenhouse gas emission 
trading in 2000 as well as the establishment of a working group within the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), and later to the creation of the 
Emission Trading Directive COM(2001) 581 submitted for approval following a 
co-decision procedure involving The European Parliament and The Council under 
the rule of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). The Directive was accepted by the 
Council in 2003, and January 1 2005 the EU ETS began operating.  
 
 
The first period of trading, here and elsewhere called Phase I of the EU ETS, 
which covered the period between 2005 and 2008, was meant as a trial period, a 
way of learning through experience how the ETS would function, before the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was to come into force beginning 
2008.  
There were many problems with the ETS in phase I, the lack of experience 
was obvious. Mainly three criticisms were aimed at the EU ETS and focused on 
the following issues: 1) Windfall Profits; 2) Over Allocation; and 3) The Allocation 
Process.  
 
The issue of windfall profits refers to how “power supply bids ‘improperly’ 
included the market value of freely allocated allowances”40
                                                      
38  Stubb, A & Wallace, H & Peterson, J in Bomberg, E & Stubb, A: “The European Union: How Does it Work?”, 
2003, p 143. 
39 Skjærseth, J B & Wettestad, J: “The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emission Trading System”, 
2008, p 8. 
40 Pew Center: “The European Union’s Emission Trading System in Perspective”, 2008, p 24 
 thus raising the 
wholesale price of electricity. However, this critique is at least in part, incorrect. 
It wasn’t the expected market price that was included, it was the opportunity 
cost “Whether an electricity generator in a competitive market has received the 
allowances for free or not, the relevant consideration in making offers to sell 
electricity is the opportunity cost of using the allowance to cover emissions. Since 
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every allowance used to cover emissions means the loss of the opportunity to sell 
that allowance, an opportunity cost is incurred and that cost is the foregone 
market price for allowances.”41
Several reasons are to blame; obviously industry pressure is a factor, the 
basic idea of setting the cap beneath business-as-usual (BAU) levels proved more 
difficult than anticipated in the short time frame that was given, not to mention 
the fact that several countries, particularly the then newly integrated eastern 
countries, were undergoing structural transformations making the whole matter 
even more difficult
. The end result was that power suppliers turned 
a huge profit at the expense of consumers due to the characteristics of the EU 
ETS. One of the proposed solutions for the issue of windfall profits is auctioning 
of permits.  
The problem of over allocation strikes at the core of the ETS as it basically 
renders the whole system useless. The problem was that the NAPs created by 
each member state were far too generous when allocating allowances.  
42. The end result was of course that the scarcity needed for 
the allowances to become a valuable and therefore tradable asset was lacking, 
instead there was an abundance of allowances leading to a dramatic fall in their 
market value from 30 euro all the way down to less than a single euro43
The final issue, related to both the previous ones, involves the allocation 
process per se, meaning how the permits were allocated by member states. 
According to the EU emissions trading Directive
, making 
the trading scheme redundant.  
 
44
                                                      
41 Ibid, p 30. 
42 Ibid, p 32. 
43 Skjærseth, J. B & Wettestad, J: Implementing EU emissions trading: success or failure?, 2008, p 276. 
44 Directive 2003/87/EC 
, at least 95% of allowances in 
the first phase must be allocated for free, leaving 5% which can be allocated 
differently. In the second phase, a minimum of 90% must be allocated for free, 
increasing the optional part to 10%. It should be noted that only four member 
states chose to auction some of the allowances, with Denmark being the only 
one using the entire 5%. The free allocation of allowances, or grandfathering as it 
is called, was widely criticized by those that would have preferred benchmarking 
or auctioning.  
 
To summarize, by and large, the failure of the EU ETS in the trial period can 
be attributed to the decentralized nature of the system and lack of bureaucratic 
manpower and knowledge in the Commission. The response, as we shall see 
soon, has been to centralize vital aspects of the system, further placing them 
under the scrutiny of the Commission which has acquired an even more 
important role as watchdog than they had before.  
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3.2 Phase II, improvements are made, but problems persist 
 
For the second period, currently in operation and spanning the period 2008-
2012, some of the problems which were present in the first phase have been 
rectified. Mainly, the issue of over-allocation has been addressed. For the second 
period, The Commission, having listened to the criticisms from the trial period 
and decided to impose much harder demands on the NAPs45. To illustrate this 
point we see that out of 27 NAPs handed in to The Commission, only one (UK) 
was unconditionally accepted, all the other were cut, some significantly so46
3.3 Phase III, EU ETS reformed in The Commissions amendment 
proposal  
. 
Relative to 2005 emission rates, the final EU cap was 6% lower while the 
unmodified NAPs had actually been several percents higher than the 2005 rate, 
meaning 25-30% reductions for some member states. However, though it 
remains too early to observe if the windfall profits will continue and the matter 
of the allocation process remains almost the same with only a 5% increase in 
allowances auctioned.  
The main point of interest here is that The Commission has chosen to expand 
their power by allowing themselves to interfere more in the NAPs, effectively 
centralizing the system. 
 
 
For the third phase, several changes were made in the proposal for 
amendment of the ET Directive, including the setting of an EU wide cap and the 
inclusion of more industries into the ETS. However, most salient was the decision 
to increase the amount of allowances allocated by auctioning from 10% in the 
second phase to 60 % in 2013 only to increase to full auctioning during phase III 
operation47
                                                      
45 Skjærseth, J. B & Wettestad, J: Implementing EU emissions trading: success or failure?, 2008, p 279-280. 
46 Poland 27% for instance. 
47 EU Commission: “Questions & Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans”, p 5. 
. More on this matter will be explained in the later sections. 
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4. Analytical focal points and concept-clarifications 
 
The following section provides some basic information needed for 
understanding the forthcoming analysis. As well as clarifying the issue regarding 
the allocation process I explain why the analysis has given The Commission such 
an important role in the process and why the EU ETS Review constitutes the 
moment in time and space appropriate for analysis. 
 
4.1 Grandfathering, Benchmarking and Auctioning 
 
When deciding the method of allocation for the ETS, normally three options 
prevail as the most likely to be used. The first, grandfathering, is the method that 
has been used predominantly so far in the EU ETS. When allowances are 
grandfathered, they are handed out by governments free, to industry entities 
based on their historic production and emission. This method was used by the US 
in their acid rain program and the positive experience they had with it laid the 
base for the Kyoto proposal on emission trading48, which, as previously 
mentioned was influential for the EU ETS. The second type of allocation is 
benchmarking, as the name implies “installations would receive allowances 
according to some ‘benchmark’ emission rate times an indicator of the 
installation’s level of economic activity, typically either output or an input such as 
energy consumption.”49
4.2 The Commission 
.The allowances would still be free, but instead of historic 
measures, a “best case scenario” would be used to determine the amount of 
allowances allocated. Lastly, auctioning obviously means that permits, or 
allowances, are auctioned to interested parties. Governments provide NAPs for 
approval, if they are approved they then auction out the allowances to their 
industry.  
 
 
Out of the major EU institutions, The Commission is definitely one of the 
more, if not the, most influential in the day to day handlings of the EU. Some call 
it a hybrid of sorts “somewhere between an executive and a bureaucracy” 
without national counterparts50 with many tasks to fulfil as set out in the 
Treaties. According to Skjærseth & Wettestad, the Commission played a key role 
in the development of the EU ETS, their entrepreneurial leadership51
                                                      
48 Damro, C & Mendez, P L in Jordan et al: “Environmental Policy in the European Union”, 2005, p 257. 
Eizenstat, S. E: “Combating Global Warming”, 1998. 
49 Pew Center: “The European Union’s Emission Trading System in Perspective”, 2008, p 36 
50 Bomberg, E & Cram, L & Martin, D in Bomberg, E & Stubb, A: “The European Union: How Does it Work?”, 
2003, p 44. 
51 Skjærseth, J B & Wettestad, J: “The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emission Trading System”, 
2008, p 8. 
 as they 
took the initiative for the instrument, and their active campaigning for it, is what 
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has made the ETS possible. There is little doubt from these authors that the 
policy would not have been accepted, or at least not as fast, had The Commission 
not taken it to heart “The European Commission itself played a key role in 
transforming the vague idea of an international emissions trading system to a 
proposal for the EU ETS. In essence, the European Commission took the initiative, 
built up knowledge based on external expertise, and crafted support among 
stakeholders”52. Despite the many roles The Commission can play in the EUs 
handlings, for this study it is The Commissions power to initiate policy which is of 
interest. As previously stated, the target material is the proposition presented by 
The Commission, not a decision taken by The Council and Parliament. The policy 
originated from The Commission, and the re-evaluation of it took part in the 
framework of The Commissions duties, the moment in time of interest is 
therefore the preparation stage of the policy, where experts and knowledge 
communities are most likely to have an impact over relevant institutions53 rather 
than the decision-making or implementation stage. Branded by Peterson and 
Bomberg as the “sub-systemic” level54. My analysis then, of the influence of 
epistemic communities over the final proposition formulated by the commission 
will focus on The Commission as it is the most appropriate target and due to its 
important role in the process. Particularly the Environment Directorate-General, 
the administrative department under the responsibility of the commissioner in 
charge of the environmental issues is of interest in this matter as “While the 
college are ultimately responsible for any decision which emanate from this 
institution, in practice many idea are generated much further down within the 
administrative structures.”55
4.3 The EU ETS review 
.  
 
 
The need for a review of the ETS was first presented in the 2006 report to 
European Parliament and The Council on the functioning of the trading system 
thus far, which also identified the main issues of concern to be taken up in the 
review56. The ETS Review was a series of meetings with stakeholders and 
interested parties held in 2007 in the framework of the ECCP Working Group on 
Emission Trading where a large amount of participants were given the 
opportunity to come together and discuss potential changes to the trading 
system. The input provided by the participants, primarily in the 3rd meeting 
which focused on allocation methods, provided a valuable source of information 
for the proposals made57
                                                      
52 Skjærseth, J B & Wettestad, J: “The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emission Trading System”, 
2008, p 8. 
53 Zito, A. R: “Epistemic communities, European Union Governance and the Public Voice”, 2001, p 470. 
54 Peterson, J & Bomberg, E: “Decision-Making in the European Union”, 1999. 
55 Bomberg, E & Cram, L & Martin, D in Bomberg, E & Stubb, A: “The European Union: How Does it Work?”, 
2003, p 48. 
. The review constitutes the context where the 
decisions, if we are to believe The Commission’s statements on the importance 
56 COM(2006)676 final 
57 COM(2008)16 final, p 3. 
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of the information provided, included in the proposal were either taken or 
outlined. Overall, following EU policy-making practices through the coordination 
method, the review laid the foundation for the proposal, and whatever decisions 
were taken after it can be traced back to it.  
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5. The revision of the allocation process, from grandfathering to 
auctioning 
 
As required by article 30 in the original ET Directive and in line with the 
review reference terms set out in COM(2006)676 final “Report pursuant to 
Article 30 of Directive 2003/87/EC”, The Commission put the EU ETS so far under 
review during four meetings with stakeholders in the spring and summer of 
2007. The outcomes of this review were presented January 23 2008 in The 
Commission’s proposals for amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC “…so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system”58
5.1 Relevant actors involved 
. 
Many changes were proposed, but the one of concern for this study is the 
decision to, as I’ve already mentioned before, raise the amount of allowances 
auctioned to an estimated mandatory 60% starting phase III in 2013 (full 
auctioning is permitted but not mandatory at that point) which will later escalate 
to full mandatory auctioning before 2020.  
 
 
During the third of the four meetings  the ECCP Working Group carried out in 
the spring of 2007 or more precisely 21-22 of May, named “Further 
harmonization and increased predictability”, issues surrounding the allocation 
process were brought to fore. Stakeholders, interested parties and institutions 
participated in discussions on the future methods of allocation to be used; 
several speakers with different points of view were given the opportunity to 
argue for their case. The results of this meeting and the conclusions taken on the 
basis of it are present in the amendment proposal and have already been 
superficially introduced. For the sake of the study, it is of vital importance to 
delve deeper into what happened and clarify who was there. Who said what? 
Who was listening? Who were the participants of the meeting? What arguments 
were brought forward? Which reports were given attention? And later, who 
provided the information on which the parties involved based their arguments? 
 
At the meeting, all member states were present, several of them made 
contributions to the debate through their speakers, notably, Italy, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark. Other than that, the attendants of 
the meeting were dominated by industry figures, individuals, company 
representatives and Industry associations. Several members of different 
Directorate-Generals were present, obviously a majority of them were from DG 
Environment including ETS front figure Jos Delbeke. 28 speakers took the word 
to address the issues at hand. Out of the total 28 speakers a slight majority were 
representatives of the European industry, either companies per se or 
organizations speaking in the place of a union of industries. On the other hand, 
Academia, thinks tanks and NGOs together managed to claim the second spot on 
                                                      
58 Ibid, Title. 
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amount of speakers, and together with the speakers of member states, they 
were a majority. The categorization may seem odd at this point, why did I mash 
together these groups? Though confusing at first glance, we shall soon see that 
these two groups constitute the two sides of the debate on whether to auction 
or not.  Coming to this meeting, The Commission’s position was open to any side 
with a slight inclination towards the idea of auctioning59
5.2 The industry’s position and argumentation 
.  
 
 
Coming to the review, industry leaders knew they would have a tough time 
to maintain their preferred position, which was, in a few words: Status Quo, or at 
the very least, not more auctioning. According to a survey conducted by 
McKinsey & Company, and later presented in collaboration with independent 
research group Ecofys and DG Environment in August 2006, when asked for their 
opinion regarding the possibility of an expanded use of auctioning of allowances 
a resounding no was the response from the companies that took part in the 
survey to the question: “Should the EU Directive allow for more auctioning 
beyond 2021?”60
• Carbon leakage is highly probable, meaning that due to increased 
emission costs carbon-emitting production is likely to move to other 
regions with more lax regulations. The problem is two-fold: 1) global 
emissions do not decrease, they simply move from one place to another; 
and 2) European companies are not able to compete on fair terms with 
companies outside the EU.  
. As is evident from the survey, the preferred method of 
allocation for companies and industry leaders is grandfathering based on 
historical emission rates, but given the trial periods failure and critique levelled 
at the allocation process the tides seemed to have changed to benefit the 
benchmarking alternative. Out of all the industry speakers, none except a few 
gas industry representatives advocated auctioning. The most common and 
strong arguments against auctioning were: 
 
• Only feasible in global context. Following up on carbon leakage, several 
speakers insisted that allowance auctioning would harm the European 
Market. If auctioning is to be implemented it should be so in a world-wide 
emission trading system, otherwise it produces an unfair disadvantage for 
European companies. 
• Likely to deter investment in EU industry.  
• Auction revenues present a problem, where does the money go? Who 
ends up benefitting at the cost of EU companies?  
• Removes funding from R&D which produces innovative solutions for 
climate change as well as allows EU companies to stay competitive.  
• Discriminates new entrants 
                                                      
59 (COM(2006)676 final, p 8. 
60 See Annex 1. 
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• “Do we really want a system where lowering production is equally 
legitimate as efficiency improvements?”61
 
Source: Final Report of the 3rd meeting of the ECCP working group on the review of the  
EU ETS & presentations of industry representatives. 
 
 
The arguments against auctioning were many and one of the few points 
which united the industry representatives around a cause. They all preferred 
benchmarking in favour of auctioning, some insisted on grandfathering though 
they seemed to realize it was a lost cause62
• It provides more incentives for developing clean technology and 
technological advancements through the lure of profit from selling 
allowances.  
, but benchmarking was a feasible 
alternative for all of them because: 
 
• Benchmark based allowance caps ensures constant development and 
emission reductions, if the benchmark is the best possible performance 
with current technology it guarantees a constant progression. From the 
ETS’s perspective, it’s efficient.  
• Experience shows that it works, no actual reference is made to such 
experiences though.  
• Transparent and easy to overlook, its simplistic design relative to 
benchmarking would make it easier to combine with other emission 
trading system (a basic ambition of the ECCP is to attempt to work 
together with other regions in a unified ETS) from other countries.  
 
Source: Final Report of the 3rd meeting of the ECCP working group on the review of the  
EU ETS & presentations of industry representatives. 
 
5.3 A coalition for auctioning 
 
On the other side of the debate stood Academic groups, NGOs, think tanks 
and independent research organs, seemingly in unison over the issue of 
auctioning adopting features of Sabatier’s definition of advocacy coalitions but 
not fully fulfilling the criteria to constitute one63
                                                      
61 Presentation by Annette Loske IFIEC Europe: “Improving Allocation Performance Based Allocation and 
Activity Rate: What is the Choice?”, Slide 9. 
62 Presentation by Marco Mensink CEPI: “Some views on improving allocation of the EU pulp and paper 
industry”, p 7. 
63 Sabatier, Paul (1988):“An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented 
learning therein” 
. Besides purely external groups 
and individuals such as the WWF, CAN and Point Carbon, one research institution 
in particular was in a favoured position relative to The Commission and may have 
acted as the so-called baggage handlers, namely Ecofys. 
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The argument of whether or not to auction allowances has been described as 
a battle between “business” and economists64
• Benchmarking is just another label for grandfathering, more or less the 
same thing only with a more complicated and expensive implementation 
procedure. Same problems would persist. 
; it is clear from the alliances 
shown at this meeting that the description was more than accurate. The 
arguments presented from this side centred on the following:  
 
• Auctioning can reduce the cost for EU tax payers, instead charging the 
ones actually responsible for the emissions, And in so doing following the 
“polluter pays” principle. 
• Transparent system with few complicated elements which can be 
overcome. 
• Allows for greater harmonization of rules throughout the EU, same 
applies to all rather than individual rules for individual companies. 
• Would prevent windfall profits (in the sense that companies in the power 
sector would not be charging for “ghost-costs” but actual costs), power 
prices would not decrease. 
• “…if future allowances are allocated as a function of present emission 
levels, firms have an incentive to emit more now in order to extract a 
larger allocation in the future.”65
• Revenues from auctions can be used for a variety of purposes, including 
developing “clean” technology. 
. 
 
Source: Final Report of the 3rd meeting of the ECCP working group on the review of the  
EU ETS & Presentations by Academia, think tanks, NGOs & GPRBs. 
 
While the speakers of the industry used arguments in their presentation 
based on internal investigations almost exclusively, with differing causal 
explanations as to the issue at hand, speakers from this side based most of their 
arguments on research conducted either by professional research institutions, or 
on internal investigation backed by a large amount of empirical evidence. 
Particularly noticeable was the level of professionalism of the ENGO’s, validating 
and legitimizing their role as policy-makers partners and councillors. The groups 
and member states in favour of increased auctioning became a loosely tied 
epistemic coalition66
                                                      
64 Climate Policy: “Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?”, 2006, abstract. 
65 Climate Policy: “Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?”, 2006, p 142. 
(This statement was not made during the meeting, the quote is taken from a research paper, however it does 
reflect and neatly summarize other statements made by participators.) 
66 Gough, C & Shackley, S: “The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: the Epistemic Communities and NGOs”, 
2001, p 332. Epistemic coalition: Coalition of groups or individuals promoting the ideas of an epistemic 
community. 
 concerned with the promotion of an idea. A problem 
perceived by them as an essential part of the well functioning of the EU ETS, 
namely the issue of whether to expand the use of allocation auctioning or not. 
Backing this epistemic coalition was a vast amount of scientists, experts and 
authoritative figures stemming from a wide variety of organizations, associations 
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and research institutions, both independent and governmental. Amongst the 
most used references and sources, besides different groups own internal reports, 
we find the Öko-institute’s report to the WWF which is used by a variety of 
NGOs, the Ecofys ''Auctioning of CO2 emission allowances in the EU ETS" report, 
the Point Carbon presentation ”Auctions – new market dynamics” and Karsten 
Neuhoff from Cambridge University’s presentation on Auction design options. 
 
Applying the technical criteria provided by Peter M. Haas set up for defining 
an epistemic community on these groups and individuals, together with others 
unnamed here, based on my extensive readings of reports positions-papers, 
research conducted and presentations made by pro-auction representatives,  
they are revealed as such. 
 
1) What is right to do. What should be done. 
- Combating climate change is the priority but the European market and 
consumers must be protected as well, the extended use of allowance 
auctioning in the EU ETS allows both objectives to be fulfilled.  
2) Why things happen in a particular way and how these perceptions 
provide the basis for elucidating cause-effect relationships.  
- Auctioning is of vital importance for the well functioning of the EU ETS. 
Other options, such as benchmarking or grandfathering are not likely to 
produce as good results. 
3) Shared methodological assumptions for determining the correct 
approach to a problem.  
- Experience from the trial period as well as consensus amongst 
environmental economic theorists favours the use of auctioning as an 
allocation method before the other options at hand. 
4) Specific and common actions to take relative to a specific problem to 
achieve what should be done.  
- To promote an implementation of an extended use of auctioning. 
 
By including in their argumentation the results of research conducted by 
prominent experts in the area of climate change like the IPCC, to more 
specialized and in this context more authoritative groups like Ecofys, the Öko-
institute as well as governmental research entities, the epistemic coalition and 
the previously detailed epistemic community behind it managed to set the 
agenda. If the ETS was on its way towards a “path”, the epistemic communities 
managed to break its stride and set it on another course. 
They managed to frame the issue of allocation and the possible policy 
alternatives at hand to a degree in which The Commissions final proposal 
reflected their position. The securing of internal “baggage handlers” in the DG 
Environment and Ecofys even before the meetings began who were friendly to 
the idea of auctioning was crucial67
                                                      
67 (COM(2006)676 final 
, and obviously the fact that many meeting 
participants were in favour of the idea was also very important. In fact, in 
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general, the only ones not in favour of auctioning were the industry 
representatives.  
The underlying reason for the influence of a knowledge-society in favour of 
auctioning is of course the failure of the allocation process in the trial period 
where “business” had been allowed to set the terms as well as the inevitable 
uncertainty associated with complex matter such as climate change. 
5.4 Framing the issue 
 
The power of epistemic communities comes from their ability to set the 
agenda, to frame issues in a way that “forces” decision-makers in their desired 
direction. During the course of the meeting, and even before it, it appeared as if 
the only plausible options were benchmarking and auctioning. Grandfathering 
wasn’t even considered, presumably because of its failure during the trial period. 
Throughout the meeting, the pro-auction camp managed to freeze out the 
option of benchmarking by providing consistent information produced within the 
epistemic community which elucidated the “correct” alternative. The industry 
representatives did what they could to counter the arguments for auctioning, 
however, given that they relied heavily on internal sources and that their reports 
differed greatly between them, the strength that might have been theirs had 
they been more coordinated was lost. According to the theory, the deciding 
factor in these situations is the authority of the sources of information; the pro-
auction camp used established experts in the subject widely accepted as reliable 
sources while the industry did not. The authority of the sources made it possible 
for auctioning to become accepted as the best alternative despite several 
obvious flaws. 
5.5 Final proposal for a directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC 
 
It is clear who The Commission, the defining actor and decision-maker in this 
context, listened to. In article 10 of the proposal presented in January 2008, 
auctioning of allowances is determined to be the basic principle for allocation 
method in the ETS. The proposal summarizes the main arguments for expanding 
the use of auctioning by stating that: 
 
“Auctioning best ensures efficiency of the ETS, transparency and simplicity of 
the system and avoids undesirable distributional effects. Auctioning also best 
complies with the polluter-pays principle and rewards early action to reduce 
emissions.”68
                                                      
68 COM(2008) 16 final, p 7. 
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6. The influence of epistemic communities, was it real? 
 
Based on what I’ve learned about the ETS Review, it would certainly seem 
like epistemic communities played an important role in setting the agenda and 
framing the issue. However, the theory as presented by Haas and his theoretical 
companions is weak in several remarks and they have become blatantly obvious 
during the course of this work. Did they really exert influence over the process? 
We know that the arguments brought forward by meeting participants came 
from groups acting more or less cooperatively through lose bonds; we also know 
that the arguments were accepted by The Commission as valid and made it into 
the proposal, but whether The Commission actually was influenced by them 
remains questionable. The decision could have been made well before the 
meeting internally, the final acceptance of arguments could be a matter of them 
choosing it for political reason rather than because they felt compelled to 
because of the influence of epistemic communities. Although EU-critics might say 
that The Commission is distanced from the people of Europe and ignore the 
media, public opinion should not be underestimated.  
Let’s not forget that although the procedure followed what is categorized as 
the coordination method, European institutions are known for handling much of 
the process behind the scene.  
It might even predominantly have been The Commissions wish to further 
comply with the polluter-pays principle which guided their decisions. I suppose 
the real question is if the same proposal for amendment would have been made 
had there not been an epistemic community present.  
Also, as stated earlier, if the decision makers are familiar with the issue it is 
probable that they choose to “call on an epistemic community whose ideas 
‘implicitly align’ with their own pre-existing political agenda and will help them 
further it”69
Finally, the role of member states remains unclear, it would have been 
equally interesting to conduct this study from an Intergovernmentalist approach, 
just as epistemic communities might have been the determinant factor behind 
the proposal it seems equally plausible to claim that the difference was made by 
the explicit wish, and implicit demand made by member states to include more 
auctioning for the third phase of the EU ETS. The material collected for this study 
is not enough to suggest that epistemic communities was behind their support 
. There’s no doubt that despite there being a general atmosphere of 
uncertainty regarding this complex issue, The Commission knew much more in 
2007-2008 than they did 2003 when the ET Directive was established. 
The main weakness in the theory as I see it is that it assumes that members 
of an epistemic community who aren’t even aware of them being included in one 
at some level cooperate to enforce policy and that the success or failure of an 
epistemic community in large part depends on this assumed cooperation, 
ignoring the fact that it might just be coincidental.  
                                                      
69 Haas, P M: “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research 
Program”, 1992, 381. 
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for auctioning, the role of national media and public opinion as well as party 
conformation might have been significant. 
 
Theoretical problems aside, based on what I’ve learned, I find it highly 
probable that The Commission was in fact influenced by expert groups in this 
case, whether or not they acted in unison or it was just coincidence will remain a 
question, as will whether or not they were the actual determining factor for the 
decision taken. To claim that my hypothesis has been confirmed would be 
incorrect; it has neither been confirmed nor denied in my view. 
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7. Epistemic communities in a democratic EU 
 
The European Union prides itself in being a champion of democracy at the 
international stage, the Copenhagen criteria, the admission requisites demand 
applicants to comply with basic democratic principles. In The White Paper on 
Governance, democracy is the guiding principle70
For one, it means that based on this case in particular, the criticisms are well 
founded. The EU does suffer from a democratic deficit, at least that’s what it 
seems like at a glance. Based on traditional perceptions of democracy, the 
involvement of epistemic communities in policy processes is an aspect of EU 
governance worth criticising. But according to Laffan et al, critique aimed at the 
EU democracy based on democratic values derived from the nation-state is 
misguided
. Yet, accusations of 
undemocratic practices are aimed at the EU on a constant basis, even more so 
since the process to sign the Lisbon Treaty began. The perception of the EU 
suffering from a democratic deficit is widespread amongst Europeans. As we 
have seen, the policymaking process in this case involved The Commission, 
member states and a wealth of individuals and groups from all over the world, 
and if we are to believe the findings, these individuals and groups are major 
actors in the policymaking process. So what does the apparent influence of 
epistemic communities, non-elected and many times external experts, mean for 
a democratic EU? 
71, “what is the appropriate benchmark against which to test the 
Union?”72. The EU is more than state, the governance system of the EU is vastly 
different from that of a Nation-state. So what is the appropriate comparison to 
make? The answer is that there are no real world comparisons to make. The EU 
is a governance system which is still developing, which handles issues and 
coordinates measures in way that nation-states have never done. Laffan et al 
state that the performance of EU democracy should be measured against the 
compliance with three core theoretical components of democracy which are: 1) 
rule of law; 2) deliberation and governance; and 3) participation and consent73
 
. 
Their conclusion is that it performs well. So what do epistemic communities 
mean for EU democracy? Based on traditional democratic values applied in 
democratic states, a step back. Based on performance criteria, where efficiency 
and quality policy based on expertise and knowledge are valued, a step forward. 
 
 
                                                      
70 COM(2001) 428 final 
71 Laffan, B & O'Donnell, R & Smith, M: “Europe's Experimental Union”, 2000, p 203. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
28 
 
 
References 
 
Bachrach, Peter & Baratz, Morton S (1962): “Two Faces of Power”, in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4 
 
Bomberg, Elisabeth & Stubb, Alexander (eds)(2003): “The European Union: How Does it 
Work?” Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
CAN-Europe, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace and WWF (2007): ECCP EU ETS review 
process written comments, available at: 
http://www.climnet.org/EUenergy/ET/072007NGO_EUETSreview_submission.pdf 
 
CAN-Europe (2007): Position Paper “Global Leadership Mean Domestic Action”, available at: 
http://www.climnet.org/EUenergy/ET/270208NGOETS_briefing.pdf 
 
Dahl, Robert: (2005): “Who Governs?” London: Yale University Press. 
 
Dietmar Duerr (Inagendo) (2007): “EU Emission Trading Fact Book”. Available at: 
http://www.inagendo.com/res/doc/inagendo_ets_fact_book.pdf 
 
Ecofys (2006): “Auctioning of CO2 emission allowances in the EU ETS”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/etsreview/ets_co2_emission_auctio
ning.pdf 
 
Ecofys (2006): “Review of EU Emission Trading Scheme, survey results”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/etsreview/results.pdf 
 
Esaiasson, Peter (ed) & Gilljam, Mikael & Oscarsson, Henrik & Wängnerud, Lena (2004): 
”Metodpraktikan: Konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad”, Norstedts Juridik AB: 
Stockholm. 
 
EU COM (2008) 16 final 
EU COM (2008) “Report of the ad hoc meeting of the EECP working group on emissions 
trading on carbon leakage and auctioning” 
EU COM (2007), “Final Report of the 1st meeting of the ECCP working group on emissions 
trading on the review of the EU ETS on The Scope of the Directive” 
EU COM (2007) List of participants ECCP working group on EU ETS review “The Scope of the 
Directive” 
EU COM (2007), “Final Report of the 2nd meeting of the ECCP working group on emissions 
trading on the review of the EU ETS on Robust Compliance and Enforcement” 
EU COM (2007) List of participants ECCP working group on EU ETS review ”Robust 
Compliance and Enforcement” 
EU COM (2007), “Final Report of the 3rd meeting of the ECCP working group on emissions 
trading on the review of the EU ETS on Further Harmonization and Increased Predictability” 
29 
 
EU COM (2007) List of participants ECCP working group on EU ETS review “Further 
Harmonization and Increased Predictability” 
EU COM (2007), “Final Report of the 4th meeting of the ECCP working group on emissions 
trading on the review of the EU ETS on Linking with emissions trading schemes of third 
countries” 
EU COM (2007) List of participants ECCP working group on EU ETS review “Linking with 
emissions trading schemes of third countries” 
EU COM (2006) 676 final “Report pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2003/87/EC” 
EU COM (2003) Directive 2003/87/EC  
EU COM (2001) 581 final ”Establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC” 
EU COM (2001) 428 final ”White Paper on Governance” 
EU COM (2000) 87 final, “Green Paper on greenhouse gas emission trading within the EU” 
EU COM(97)0481 final: “The EU Approach for Kyoto” 
 
EU MEMO/08/35 “Q&A on the Commission's proposal to revise the EU Emissions Trading 
System” 
 
Gough, Clair & Shackley, Simon (2001): “The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: the 
Epistemic Communities and NGOs”, in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1944), Vol. 77, No. 2. 
 
Greenpeace (2008): “Greenpeace draft position paper on the European Commission 
legislative proposals”, available at: http://www.ecologic-
events.de/cdmworkshop/documents/sideridou_briefing.pdf 
 
Haas, Peter (1992): “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination”, in International Organization, Vol. 46 No 1. 
 
Haas, Peter (1992): “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a 
Reflective Research Program”, in International Organization, Vol. 46 No 1. 
 
Hay, Colin (2002): “Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction” Hampshire: Palgrave. 
 
International Organization, Vol. 46: “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy” 
 
Jenson, Jane & Denis Saint-Martin (2003). "Is Europe still Sui Generis?”, Département de 
science politique Université de Montréal.  Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/455/01/Jenson-
Saint-Martin-EUSA_2003_1_.pdf 
 
Jordan, Andrew (ed) (2005): “Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors institutions 
& Processes” 2nd edition, Earthscan, London.  
 
Kruger, Joseph & Pizer, William. A (RSS org) (2004): ”The EU Emissions Trading Directive: 
Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls”, Available at: http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-
04-24.pdf 
 
30 
 
Laffan, Bridget & O'Donnell, Rory & Smith, Michael (2000): “Europe's Experimental Union” 
London: Routledge. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew: 1999. “The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht” Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Peterson, John (1995): “Decision-making in the European Union: Towards a framework 
for analysis”, in Journal of European Public Policy,2:1. 
 
Peterson, John & Bomberg, Elizabeth E (1999): “Decision-making in the European Union”. 
Macmillan, New York, N.Y. 
 
Pew Center: “The European Union Emission Scheme, Insights and opportunities”. Available 
at: http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS%20White%20Paper.pdf 
 
Pew Center (2007): “The European Union’s Emission Trading System in Perspective”, 
available at: http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf 
 
Point Carbon (2007): “Options and requirements of auctioning allowances in the EU ETS”, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/6a.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Annette Loske (IFIEC Europe) (2007): “Improving 
Allocation Performance Based Allocation and Activity Rate: What is the Choice?”, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3j.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Marco Mensink (CEPI) (2007): “Some views on 
improving allocation of the EU pulp and paper industry”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3g.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Vianney Schyns, (IFIEC Europe) (2007): ”Improving 
Allocation: Performance-based allocation is feasible …”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3b.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Alistair J Steel (Chlor industry) (2007): “Euro Chlor 
Energy Issues”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3c.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Guy Tackels (CPIV) (2007): “Allocation method in 
the Glass Industry”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3h.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Kevin Farrell (CERAME-UNIE) (2007): “Key 
positions of the European Ceramics Industry on ETS and allocation methods”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3i.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Dr Jean-Marie CHANDELLE Chandelle 
(CEMBERAU) (2007): “CO2 Reduction: Sectoral Approach in Cement Industry, Development of 
31 
 
a Conceptual Scheme”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3f2.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Yves de Lespinay (EULA) (2007): “Global Lime 
Carbon Allocation Model”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3e.pdf 
 
Presentation at ETS Review 3rd meeting by Peter Botschek (CEFIC) (2007): “Solutions for an 
improved ETS”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/3d.pdf 
 
Presentation by Karsten Neuhoff & Michael Grubb (University of Cambridge) (2007): 
“Auctioning under a single EU-wide cap or national caps: design options”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/harmonisation/6b.pdf 
 
Sabatier, Paul (1988):“An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of 
policy-oriented learning therein”, in Policy Sciences Vol 21. 
 
SEC (2008) 85/3 “EU Commission Staff Working Group Impact Assessment” 
SEC (2008) 52 “EU Commission Staff Working Group Impact Assessment” 
 
Skjærseth, Jon Birger & Wettestad, Jörgen (2008): “The Origin, Evolution and Consequences 
of the EU Emissions Trading System”, available for download at: 
Http://www.allacademic.com/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=prol01_search&offset=0&limit=5&multi_searc
h_search_mode=publication&multi_search_publication_fulltext_mod=fulltext&textfield_submit=true&search_
module=multi_search&search=Search&search_field=title_idx&fulltext_search=The+origin%2C+evolution+and+
consequences+of+the+EU+emissions+trading+system 
 
Skjærseth, Jon Birger & Wettestad, Jörgen (2008): “Implementing EU emissions trading: 
success or failure?”, available at: 
http://www.springerlink.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/content/82825652xm42032q/fulltext.pdf 
Skjærseth, Jon Birger & Wettestad, Jörgen: 2008 “EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-
making and Implementation”. Aldershot, Ashgate. 
Stone Sweet, Alec, Sandholtz, Wayne & Fligstein, Neal (eds): 2001. The Institutionalization of 
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sundström, Mikael (2000): “A Brief Introduction: What is an Epistemic Community?”. 
Available at: http://www.svet.lu.se/joluschema/epistcomm.pdf 
 
Wiener, Antje & Diez, Thomas (eds)(2004) “European Integration Theory” Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Zito, Anthony. R (2001): “Epistemic communities, European Union Governance and the Public 
Voice”, in Science and Public Policy, volume 28, number 6. 
 
32 
 
Öko-institute & WWF (2007): “The environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme:”, available at: 
http://www.wwf.de/imperia/md/content/klima/2005_11_08_full_final__koinstitut.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Annex 1: Survey results (Ecofys) 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
